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Abstract
Technocratic governments and similar systems that give more voice to experts in the decision-making process are one
of the potential alternatives to traditional representative party government. These alternatives have become increasingly
popular, especially in countries where strong political disaffection and previous favourable pro-expert attitudes exist simul-
taneously. The Spanish case is one of these settings, with the emergence of a political party, Ciudadanos (Citizens), that
represents these ideas. This article contributes to the understanding of public opinion support for an expert government,
its main motives, and social supports. We claim that experts are not so much a decision-making alternative as they are a
desired piece of the decision-making process. Support for a more significant role for experts comes especially from those
that credit themwith ample technical capacities, but most citizens want them to work as a piece of representative govern-
ment, not as an alternative to it. The article combines two types of evidence: A survey of a representative sample of the
population, including innovative questions about support to expert governments, and 10 focus groups that allow a more
in-depth comprehension of the support (and criticism) of an increased role for experts. The results provide a nuanced
picture of the types of expert involvement sought and their respective social support.
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1. Introduction
Significant theoretical research of the last decades high-
lights an increased desire for ‘unmediated’ political pro-
cesses that challenge party democracy (Caramani, 2017;
Urbinati, 2014). For some years the debate has been ori-
ented to empirically linking this trend with the study of
populist attitudes among citizens. Literature has demon-
strated the existence of significant support for a politi-
cal system away from the central values of party democ-
racy. Furthermore, studies have found a percentage of
the population with populist attitudes that are signifi-
cantly linked to a preference for voting populist parties
(Akkerman, Mudde, & Zaslove, 2014, pp. 14–18).
The striking point in the research of populism atti-
tudes has been the (unexpected) link between populism
attitudes with those of elitism. Akkerman, Mudde, and
Zaslove (2014, p. 18) note that people who may be
attracted to populist parties score high on both the pop-
ulist and elitist scales. They mentioned that features of
some populist parties such as “charismatic leadership,
centralized parties, the so-called outsider status of the
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leader” may also appeal to those with higher elitist atti-
tudes. Theoretically, the relationship between populism
and elitism has been built on the links that technocracy
has with the same populism’s ideals, because it entails
a similar unitary and idyllic vision of society, advocating
unmediated political relations (Caramani, 2017). Both
would be in opposition to the classic conception of party
democracy, questioning (1) the role of mediation of the
parties and (2) the procedural conception of democratic
legitimacy (Bickerton & Invernizzi Accetti, 2017, p. 190).
From the supply side, it seems that populism and
elitism (via technocracy) could be combined. Recent
studies have shown the emergence of new political par-
ties bringing together both populism and technocracy
ideals, the so-called technocratic populism (Bickerton &
Inverzzini Accetti, 2018; de la Torre, 2013). Buštíková
and Guasti (2019, p. 304) say that technocratic pop-
ulism “strategically uses the appeal of technocratic com-
petence and weaponizes numbers to deliver a populist
message. It combines the ideology of expertise with a
populist political appeal to ordinary people.”
From this perspective, we could think that the use
of “the ideology of expertise” (technocracy) allows pop-
ulist parties to reject party democracy from a rational
grounding (science). However, from demand side stud-
ies, the use of the term technocracy is not so clear.
Many studies have found evidence of an important pres-
ence of technocratic attitudes in various countries; how-
ever, they were attitudes often related to other polit-
ical procedures such as citizen participation or party
elections (Font, Wojcieszak, & Navarro, 2015; Webb,
2013). An international comparative research (Bertsou &
Pastorella, 2017) showed a high presence of technocrat-
ic attitudes among the European population. However,
more recent research, including a new methodology to
analyse such attitudes, revealed a significantly lower inci-
dence (Bertsou & Caramani, in press), reducing the per-
centage of technocratic attitudes among the population
dramatically. We can conclude that themost recent stud-
ies on technocratic attitudes among individuals are not
conclusive. The ideology of expertise can be used by pop-
ulist parties to legitimate a rejection of party democracy,
but it is no entirely clear to what extent individual tech-
nocratic attitudes will support it.
This article aims to analyse in detail the techno-
cratic attitudes of the population to shed light on the
implications they have on the political regime and to
what extent their presence implies a rejection of par-
ty democracy. Most of the studies that have shown
an indication of some form of technocratic attitudes
among the population (Bertsou & Pastorella, 2017;
Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002) have based their evi-
dence on a single statement: ‘Having experts, not gov-
ernment, make decisions according to what they think
is best for the country’ as it appears in the European
Values Survey. Following the results of the most recent
research (Bertsou & Caramani, in press), we may ques-
tion whether this statement embraces all the dimen-
sions of the matter related to a government of experts.
If we consider the analytical distinction elaborated by
Bickerton and Invernizzi Accetti (2017), the questionmay
tell usmore about the different roles that political agents
have in the mediation between citizens and the state
than about the procedures of representative democra-
cy. It is very illustrative that in these investigations the
relationship between technocratic attitudes and political
distrust in government is always high. Even if technocra-
cy, as an ideology of expertise, is not the only way to
highlight anger towards party politics, the presence of
technocratic attitudes among people could be a way to
criticize the functioning of the democracy, rather than
a rejection of the principles of representative democra-
cy. In order to develop this argument, we will show the
result we obtained by taking the question used to identi-
fy technocratic attitudes as it appears in the European
Values Survey, and then contrast those results with a
question that mentions different ways to engage experts
in the government (as advisers or rulers).
The study is based on a combination of quantita-
tive and qualitative information which comes from the
Andalusia region in Spain in 2015. The result of the quali-
tative research allowed us to understand the importance
that the problem of the procedural conception of demo-
cratic legitimacy acquired for citizens when speaking
about technocracy. The representative survey adds ques-
tions in order to distinguish this problem directly. The
results show that the majority of the population wants
to listen to what experts have to say without chang-
ing the procedural legitimacy of representative decision
making. Confidence in the skills of experts (capacity) and,
to a lesser extent, preference for a pro-technocratic party
(Ciudadanos) are the principal factors linked to support-
ing a more substantial role for experts in government.
In the next section, we will review the relations
between public opinion and views on technocracy. The
following section describes and justifies themethodolog-
ical strategy developed in this article. Subsequently, we
engage with the empirical analysis; we start off by look-
ing at the content from the focus groups and use this
as the basis for justifying the different views on experts,
which are then examined in the succeeding two quanti-
tative sections (firstly descriptively, and then by regres-
sion analysis). The article closes with a discussion of the
results and their implications.
2. Technocracy and Political Procedures
The study of technocratic attitudes among citizens is not
recent. The value of technocracy in politics has been
praised because it draws together elements believed
to be characteristic of good government, such as dis-
tance from clientelist networks and concern with effi-
ciency. The result would be a form of “stealth democra-
cy,” a thinly-veiled desire by governments to avoid ide-
ological conflict and situate politics in the domain of
impartial and neutral analysis (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse,
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2002). Scholars have found growing support for stealth
democracy among citizens in several European countries,
where it apparently enjoys a large social acceptance
(Font et al., 2015; Webb, 2013).
The problem is that these studies are not entirely
conclusive. The same works find similar support for oth-
er forms of political organization related to citizen par-
ticipation or the classic representative model. Bertsou
and Pastorella (2017) then analyse technocratic attitudes
in Europe based on the recent link found between pop-
ulism and technocracy. They understand their presence
in contrast to the current political elites, so “a pref-
erence for independent expertise also entails a belief
that the people are unable to select worthy decision-
makers through the current democratic system” (Bertsou
& Pastorella, 2017, p. 433). Therefore, they think that
technocratic attitudes will be influenced by individual
evaluation of representative democracy in an expected
negative relation.
Citizen distrust towards the functioning of party-
based politics used to be thought of as an attitude
that favoured the desire of the citizenry for greater
involvement in decision-making processes (Norris, 2011).
This was also the postmaterialist thesis with which
Inglehart (1990) linked political disaffection to a greater
wish to be involved in political affairs. The studies on
stealth democracy were the first to point out that the
data indicated more of an inclination towards techno-
cratic modes of government, aimed at making decisions
efficiently. The link between populism and technocra-
cy backed by empirical studies (Akkerman et al., 2014;
Bertsou& Caramani, in press) has displaced that relation-
ship, suggesting a desire for modes of less openly demo-
cratic governance.
The debate around technocracy has been success-
ful in raising the importance that expertise has in con-
temporary societies and questioning to what extent its
desire on the part of citizens can effectively end up dis-
placing the principles of liberal democracy, as it has been
suggested by the analysis of the new parties character-
ized by technocratic populism (Bickerman & Inverzzini
Accetti, 2018; Buštíková & Guasti, 2019). It is often tak-
en for granted that technocracy, the ideology of exper-
tise, implies a political relationship ‘without mediation’
wherebymore expertsmean fewer parties, as if thiswere
a zero-sum game (Urbinati, 2014). However, the role that
technical skills and expertise have played in the develop-
ment of contemporary societies (Radaelli, 1999; Turner,
2001) may suggest that they are valued positively by
citizens, where the presence of more experts does not
imply directly fewer parties, but rather more knowledge
and science in the execution of some government tasks.
Public acceptance of technical skills and expertise could
be owed also to a change in the nature of politics, where
knowledge has become a key element (Fischer, 1990).
We can, from this perspective, understand the role that
some individuals attribute to experts (because of their
technical skills and expertise) as a facilitator for a rational
framework, removed from all that parties are criticised
for (egoism, loyalty issues, etc.; Radaelli, 1999).
This demand on technical skills and expertise in the
government can be approached from different argu-
ments. On the one hand, it is advocated by those driv-
en by a desire for impartiality, aside from political dis-
putes (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002). Commitment to
a growing role for experts would mean identifying pol-
itics with the idea of truth—government as epistocra-
cy (Urbinati, 2014). Here, experts are expected to rule.
On the other hand, other positions back the relevant
role of technical skills as an element which supports the
government’s tasks. From this perspective, it may be
considered that contemporary politics simply cannot do
without facts and experts in a complex world (Eriksen,
2011; Radaelli, 1999). Here, experts are expected to
advise. This means that the inclination towards technoc-
racy may involve (1) replacing elections so that decision-
makers are experts or (2) consulting experts in the
decision-making process to make politics more efficient.
This distinction is absent in the majority of studies
which seek to shed light on society’s attitudes to tech-
nocracy. If we empirically consider the two analytical
key features that Bickerton and Invernizzi Accetti (2017)
used to identify party democracy—political mediation
and the procedural conception of political legitimacy—
we can broaden and better approximate the meaning
that technocracy can have for citizens. The general ques-
tion used to link technocracy and populism, as well as
concluding that citizenship legitimates a technocratic
government, refers us to the first feature that charac-
terizes party democracy (political mediation). According
to Bickerton and Invernizzi Accetti (2017), this func-
tion assumes that parties reflect both material and
ideal social divisions and are politically constituted as
competitive visions of the common good. Hibbing and
Theiss-Morse (2002) convincingly analysed the relation-
ship between the desire for more experts and citizens’
negative evaluation of disputes between political rep-
resentatives. The typical question posed to emphasise
technocratic attitudes tends to focus on comparing the
merits of experts to those of other actors (parties and
political leaders) who generate little trust. It is there-
fore not strange to find a negative relationship between
technocratic attitudes and representative democracy in
empirical studies (Bertsou & Pastorella, 2017). But it is
worth asking whether this relationship (political medi-
ation) is directly linked to the rejection of the political
procedures that characterize party democracy, where
experts are expected to advise. Considering the proce-
dures means keeping in mind that the results of party
democracy do not depend on a pre-political conception
of truth, but rather depend on a more complex and dif-
fuse process, in which the majority is obtained from the
elections and subsequent negotiations between differ-
ent agents (Bickerton & Invernizzi Accetti, 2017). If this
is the case, we might think that the high presence of
technocratic attitudes may be based on the trust that cit-
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izens have in experts, and less on a distrust of the proce-
dural principles of liberal democracy, such as elections.
In order to get closer to the value that citizens give to
the political procedures of democracy by parties, we will
compare the support of the public for a decision-making
procedure that includes experts as rulers and as advisers.
The question in this research is based on how experts
are valued by society. In all surveys, support for scien-
tists is usually greater than that for politicians (Krause,
Brossard, Scheufele, Xenos, & Franke, 2019). The expert,
contrary to the politician, is valued on the basis of merits
and qualities which do not depend on their political posi-
tion, but rather on their knowledge and technical skills.
This confers on them a significant prestige, based on its
singular capacities, in contrast with politicians who forge
their success by means of capacities founded on privi-
lege, not prestige.
Thus, our objective is to distinguish citizens’ support
for a government where experts are present from that
for onewhere they are effectively in charge of its political
steering. Are we talking about a government of experts
as an alternative to a representative government or do
we mean an accompanying presence of experts within
the context of a representative democracy? In view of
this framework, we formulate the following hypotheses:
H1: Preferences for experts in government are
reduced when their specific role in the political
decision-making process is stressed. Many citizens
who support the presence of experts in government,
do not support that theymake final binding decisions.
H2: All preferences for experts in government are
related to their perceived technical skills (capacity) to
resolve public affairs.
H3: All preferences for experts in government are
related to support for a pro-technocratic party
(Ciudadanos).
H4: The explanatory factors that support a govern-
ment in which experts advise will differ from those
supporting a government in which they make bind-
ing decisions. For example, leftist voters may not be
against experts advise, but will reject a government
lead by experts.
3. Methodology and Data
We have combined quantitative and qualitative research
in a mix method strategy. On the one hand, qualitative
research allows us to look deeper into the arguments
used by people when they discuss the political crisis and
the alternatives they envision. A qualitative investiga-
tion with focus groups gives participants time to think
through answers and engage in a discussion with oth-
ers. In our case, it was through the focus groups that
we were able to appreciate that the problem of techno-
cratic attitudes was more complex; when talking about
the suitability of experts for political positions, among
other things because they are considered to be better
prepared, the question of the legitimacy of the politi-
cal results obtained always arose as an insurmountable
problem for the majority. By using this method, we elic-
it what Stoker, Hay, and Barr (2016) call ‘slow thinking,’
giving people the necessary space to reflect on com-
plex issues. On the other hand, the survey will enable us
to analyse citizens’ preferences about different political
processes (direct democracy, technocracy, and represen-
tative democracy) and will, in particular, allow us to test
the conclusions of the qualitative study on technocracy
views on a representative sample of the population.
The focus groups took place between March and
September 2015. There were 10 in total, with 6 to 8 par-
ticipants of homogenous profiles in each group in order
to facilitate a debate. The sample framework design is
based on variability criteria related to socio-political posi-
tions. Six groups were designed according to the educa-
tion, professional and associative profile of the partici-
pants, as well as their age (high income and high-level
education group vs low income and low-level education;
group of young university students vs group of young
people without any studies; group of activists in tradi-
tional organisations vs groups of young alter-globalist
activists). A further four groups were designed with the
aim of directly recording the opinions of supporters of
the four principal political parties at thatmoment—PSOE
(Socialist Workers’ Party, centre-left), PP (People’s Party,
right), Ciudadanos (Party of the Citizenry, centre-right),
and Unidas Podemos (UP, United We Can, left). That’s
to say, we aimed for variability, at the same time as
ensuring we could study some positions in particular
detail. Details about the make-up of groups appear in
Ganuza and Font (2018). The distinction between politi-
cized and non-politicized groups is based on previous
studies which indicate how significant personal experi-
ence related to politics and resources available to individ-
uals are when evaluating technocratic attitudes (Bertsou
& Pastorella, 2017). Data was transcribed and analysed
using Atlas.ti. All references to ‘experts’ were codified,
with the objective of identifying the key issues for the
study: (1) the value of experts in politics; and (2) their
role in government.
The survey uses a probability sample. The fieldwork
was conducted between November and December 2015
(EP-1510 IESA/CSIC). The 1081 interviews carried out,
with their correspondingweighting, are an adequate rep-
resentation of the region’s adult population. The survey
results have an estimated level of absolute maximum
sampling error of ± 3.1% for a 95% confidence interval.
Participants completed the questionnaire online (53%)
or by phone (47%).
Andalusia is a region that provides an interesting
context for the study of views on technocracy; there is
an elevated level of distrust in institutions and an inter-
est in politics situated below European standards—two
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indicators related to the increase of technocratic atti-
tudes amongst the population (Ganuza & Font, 2018).
The region shares common characteristics with the rest
of Spainwith regards to the high level of positive respons-
es to the traditional question about support for an expert
government (Font et al., 2015). Moreover, it is there that
Ciudadanos, a political force which defends technocrat-
ic arguments, first gained an important position in elec-
tions, becoming the chief political ally of the Andalusian
socialist government after the elections in December
2015. The party’s stance shares some characteristicswith
what Buštíková and Guasti (2019, p. 302) call technocrat-
ic populism, such as ‘the appeal of technical expertise’
and ‘promising to run the state as a firm.’ Although a
more in-depth study of the party’s discourse would be
necessary to find out if it indeed fits in this category, their
defence of the ‘government of the best’ is a constant fea-
ture. Within this context, where Ciudadanos and its pro-
posals are deemed relevant and enjoy sufficient visibility,
a particularly interesting setting emerges for the study of
relations between a political force and citizens’ attitudes
to technocracy. Lastly, this Andalusian investigation is
based on previous work about the Spanish case (Font
et al., 2015; Ganuza, García-Espín, & de Marco, 2017)
which has facilitated the construction of the hypotheses
tested here through the inclusion of additional newques-
tions in the survey.
4. Qualitative Empirical Evidence:
Experts vs. Democracy
All focus groups openly criticized the current state of
democracy and in particular the way political parties
operate. But democracy, as a political framework, was
not questioned. Parties are responsible for distorting the
political game of representation, with internal relations
governed by loyalty to leaders where merit is absent.
Such a system nourishes corruption and clientelism, and
the emergence of politicians ‘who are not qualified.’ This
is a core point in the debate surrounding the political
crisis and is the reason why so many participants val-
ue merit and knowledge in politics, and connect them
to experts.
For example, for supporters of the conservative party
(PP), the problem was the absence of politicians with a
professional profile who ‘should have worked in some-
thing else beforehand.’ However, the value of ‘knowl-
edge’ and ‘merit’ as a crucial variable to evaluate politics
is, albeit with varying intensity, very similar in the major-
ity of focus groups. For supporters of the socialist par-
ty, politicians also ‘should know more.’ People who have
knowledge are people who have studied and have had a
job because they knowhow to do something, as opposed
to politicians. They are usually identified by participants
as experts—people with technical skills.
Young people represent the part of civil societywhich
most strongly defends experts. For young people with-
out studies, it is experts who ‘know the truth.’ For them,
anyone aspiring to rule should emulate the meritocra-
cy inherent in a professional career, in other words ‘in
order to rule one should have one or two degrees and be
experienced.’ University students were alsomanifestly in
favour of technical skills and expected knowledge from
those whowork in politics. Only precarious and low qual-
ified workers had a discourse which rejectedmeritocracy
as the backbone of politics.
The importance attached to knowledge and merit
may partially explain the allure of experts in politics. They
reflect the idea of a profession underpinned by tech-
nical skills and capacities, and free of ideological bias.
The debate amongst participants of most groups always
featured the ideal technocratic scenario pointed out by
Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002)—impartial and con-
trasted by almost everyone with the way politics func-
tions normally.
That said, participants’ conversations in all groups
highlighted that it is one thing to talk about politi-
cal efficiency, where knowledge and expertise should
be present, and quite another to define a government
just around experts, opposed to the procedural concep-
tion of democratic legitimacy, which resides with citi-
zenry and elections. Here, notable differences emerged
amongst the groups, but the debate moved towards
defining the significance that experts should have in a
democratic framework. The global response to a gov-
ernment of experts regarding democratic legitimacy was
more negative than positive. For most, it is a question
of avoiding ‘clientelism’ and ‘favouritism,’ not so much
of organising a government with a uniquely expertise
dimension. The twomost polarised groups in this respect
are young university students and precarious workers.
The latter do not trust the figure of an expert who is cut
off from reality and who ‘does not have people in mind.’
For them, a government of experts only cuts expenses
and crunches numbers: ‘if the numbers don’t add up for
the mathematician, we’ll end up with nothing.’ At the
other extreme, we find the young university students.
For them the issue of experts is important and they ded-
icate plenty of time to it in their conversations. They are
convinced that a government should be chosen by ‘the
people’ (elections), although some would want to com-
bine a system of experts with the democratic standards
of an eligible and revocable government, and speak of a
political government (not formed of experts), but select-
ed ‘by public oppositions.’
This idealised vision of experts (in the politically most
conservative groups and amongst young educated peo-
ple) stands in contrast to that of the more progressive
groups. For them, experts have an ideology and are
indebted to a particular vision of society, amongst oth-
er reasons because ‘they normally come from the upper
classes, from well-off families.’ For young people, from
alter-globalists associations and supporters of left-wing
parties, experts come hand-in-hand with academic quali-
fications, although this is separated fromanother value—
experience, real contact with people, which comes with
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having a job. With this differentiation (experts versus
experience), the more leftist participants imply that any
person without studies may have valuable experience
without necessarily having specialised knowledge. For
them, experts’ knowledgehas a place in government, but
it only makes sense to consider the value of experts in
public management when experts and experience are
set apart, with the latter not only extant in the domain
of those with the highest formal education.
Experts’ knowledge is defended in quite a differ-
ent way by more politically conservative groups (centre-
right voters and qualified workers). The rejection of an
experts’ government rests on a functional differentiation
between politicians and experts: the former rule and the
lattermanage. The groupsmount a radical defence of the
role of experts andwould even increase their role in detri-
ment of that of politicians, reducing the scope of action
that politicians currently have (‘Why doweneed somany
politicians to move the mechanism of the state if there
are magnificent civil workers who are trained, qualified
and brilliant at doing so?’), but they never accept a gov-
ernment of only experts.
We can observe how some groups take a line
of defending technocracy as an ideology of expertise,
although none reject the idea that a democratic govern-
ment should be elected and that therefore, there is no
room for a government formed entirely of experts. In the
very instant that procedures in democratic legitimacy are
contemplated within perspectives on technocracy, par-
ticipants’ discourse shifts and the call for an increased
role for experts is not accompanied by a desire that they
should actually rule, only that they are there to be con-
sulted. In the next section, we will look at this point in
more detail, given that this tension has been taken into
consideration in the survey.
5. Quantitative Descriptive Evidence: The Apparent
Charm of Experts
The survey also shows that citizens have considerable
support for a greater presence of experts in decision-
making processes. Figure 1 reflects the significant back-
ing enjoyed by experts, in contrast to what we may iden-
tify as the model of representative democracy (those
who govern take decisions). As other studies have shown
(Bertsou & Pastorella, 2017), about half of the sample is
fully supportive (8–10 agreement on a 0–10 scale) of the
possibility of important decisions being taken by inde-
pendent experts, with the number increasing if instead
of asking about taking decisions we speak of ‘consulting.’
However, as already identified in the focus groups,
when experts’ increased role is compared with alterna-
tive political procedures to decision-making, support is
attenuated (Figure 2): If instead of mentioning ‘rulers,’
we focus on the procedure that characterizes party
democracy—elections—we find that support for elec-
tions is clearly stronger (62% choose a value from 8
to 10) than for experts taking important political deci-
sions (46%).
A similar pattern is observed if we make the compar-
ison with participative mechanisms. For example, deci-
sion taking in assemblies enjoys more high support (52%
from 8 to 10) than experts making decisions (30% as
opposed to 20%). Support is only somewhat lower for
referendums. As we saw with the focus groups, when
we shift the question to a broader political procedural
perspective, support for formulas based on experts is
less substantial if we compare it with other decisions—
making procedures.
This result can be better understood if we observe
the precise role which citizens want experts to have
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Figure 1. Agreement with expert role in government.
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Figure 2. Support for alternative procedures to decision-making.
participants in the focus groups highlighted, survey
respondents had to choose between the following three
options: (1) forego experts altogether; (2) listen to them
but do not have them take decisions; and (3) allow
them to participate in decisions directly. The results
show clearly that very few citizens think that experts are
expendable (6.3%), while the most common position is
‘listen, but not decide’ (66.3%). Support for experts in
government is notably lower (25.6%). Our first hypoth-
esis is therefore supported.
Social support to each of the positions is quite
unevenly distributed. Thus, amongst those most reluc-
tant to listen to experts, we find left-wingers and some of
the social groups in amore precarious situation—profiles
similar to those observed in the focus groups. On the
contrary, those most in favour of an expert government
are older people and voters of Ciudadanos. The regres-
sion analysis in the next section will enable us to analyse
these differences in detail.
6. Who Supports Experts and Why?
Regression Analysis
Support for an increased presence for experts changes if
we look at generic support or at the possible functions
of experts; it is therefore reasonable to expect that the
underlying factors that explain these attitudes also differ.
The majority of research carried out until now has analy-
sed the first of these attitudes (Del Rio, Navarro, & Font,
2016; Rapeli, 2016), and here we compare it with sup-
port for a scenario where experts are not only listened
to but also take decisions.
We therefore use two dependent variables. Firstly,
the affirmation ‘allow experts to take political decisions’
(scale 0 to 10). This question is similar to that used by
most research about technocratic attitudes as it appears
in the European Values Survey. Secondly, the question
about what role experts should occupy in government,
differentiating between those who are in favour of
experts taking directly political decisions and those who
hold different views (to be consulted orwithout any role).
This question tries to capture the importance of polit-
ical procedures, because participants have to choose
between experts as rulers or advisers.
What factors help us to understand support to both
attitudes?We include twomain explanations and a wide
set of control variables. Firstly, there is a variable which
refers to the qualities of decision makers. According to
Del Rio et al. (2016) the (perceived) qualities of the main
actors in decision—making (experts, in our case) become
an important explanatory factor. This argument fits in
with the significance of skills attached to experts in the
qualitative study and, in particular, their capacity based
onmerit and knowledge, which will consequently be the
quality we use. Del Rio et al. (2016) explicitly acknowl-
edge that one of the limitations of their work was the
lack of data on citizens’ perception of the qualities of
experts. Our survey allows to analyse, on a scale of 0
to 10, if this measure is important. Table 1 shows the
descriptive characteristics of all the independent vari-
ables used.
Another important set of factors useful for under-
standing support for experts are political preferences.
Although Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002) argued that
people’s support for political processes were indepen-
dent of ideology, several works (Bengtsson & Mattila,
2009; Bertsou&Pastorella, 2017) have shown the impact
of ideology, and in particular the difference between pro-
gressist and other values. We distinguish between leftist
voters (positions 0–3 on a 0–10 scale), versus the rest.
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Table 1. Descriptive characteristics of the independent variables.
Variable Min Max Mean value Standard dev. Categories of answer
Capacity (skills) of experts 0 10 7 2.2 Scale 0–10
Left ideology (0–3) 0 1 0.22 0.41 Categorical—0: No; 1: Yes
Vote 0 4 — — 0: Others (Reference category); 1: PP;
2: Cs; 3: PSOE; 4: UP
Efficacy, not debate 1 4 3.2 0.8 Scale of 1: Strongly Agree;
to 4: Strongly Disagree
Politics difficult for people like me 1 4 2.5 0.9 Scale of 1: Strongly Agree;
to 4: Strongly Disagree
Political trust 0 40 14.5 9.4 Additive scale 0–40
Social trust 0 10 5.5 2.7 Scale 0–10
Participation vs representation 0 10 4.6 2.8 Bipolar scale 0–10 (0: participation;
10: representation)
No Materialism 0 1 0.32 0.47 0: Materialists; 1: non materialists
Education 1 5 2.3 2.21 Scale 1–5
Age 16 91 46.4 16.7 Continuous
Moreover, in Spain a new political party, Ciudadanos,
has emerged; both the party’s discourse and the pro-
file of its elites manifestly defend a greater presence
of experts in the decision-making process (Lavezzolo &
Ramiro, 2017). Thus, we included vote recall in the last
regional election as an independent variable.
The control variables introduced correspond to alter-
native explanations of preferences for political processes
suggested by previous research:
• Views on how much debate versus efficacy there
should be in our form of government (Hibbing &
Theiss-Morse, 2002). A scale of ‘Strongly Agree’ to
‘Strongly Disagree’ with the following statement:
‘Institutions should focus on being efficient and
dedicate less time to debating different points
of view.’
• Internal political efficacy (degree of agreement
with the statement ‘politics are too difficult for
people like me’).
• Political trust is one of the basic underlying fac-
tors that explain preferences for representative
or alternative political processes (Bengtsson &
Mattila, 2009; Rapeli, 2016; Bertsou & Pastorella,
2017). We use an additive scale of the four tradi-
tional indicators of political trust available in the
survey: overall confidence in political parties, cen-
tral government, judicial power and political sys-
tem. Cronbach’s alfa is 0,83.
• Low levels of social trust may also encourage pref-
erence for an expert government, as has been
pointed out by previous research (García-Espín,
Ganuza, & de Marco, 2017). We include the clas-
sic scale (0–10) used to measure social trust.
• Font et al. (2015) highlighted a negative rela-
tion between participative and technocratic pref-
erences. We use the bipolar participation versus
representation scale mentioned in their work: “On
a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means that citizens
should take directly all decisions and 10 that politi-
cians should take all decisions, where would you
place yourself?”
• These process preferences should be related to
the desired role for citizens in political life. To mea-
sure it, we incorporate the most traditional mea-
surement (postmaterialism) of these values, in the
analysis (materialist citizens versus the rest). The
survey included the usual two-fold question about
materialist versus postmaterialist priorities. Given
that the number of absolute postmaterialists was
very low, we used a dichotomous variable created
on the basis of these priorities, which distinguishes
between those who chose two materialist options
from others who did not do so (postmaterialists or
mixed cases, in the traditional terminology).
• We included a variable for education, as other
international research (e.g., Coffé&Michels, 2014)
and our own focus groups show that it could be an
important explanatory factor.
• Finally, since age has been shown to be related to
preferences for expert government (Rapelli, 2016),
we also include this variable with no further trans-
formation.
Table 2 shows the results of a linear regression for the
traditional variable representing support for the idea of
an expert government. The first thing which stands out
is the especially high (and significant) effect of the per-
ceived capacity (technical skills) of experts, as it was sug-
gested by our second hypotheses. An individual who
rates all other variables 0 and also gives 0 to capacity of
experts may have a 3 on the scale (0–10) of support for
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Table 2. Explanatory factors of support for experts (linear regression).
Scale 0–10 support for experts
Variables Coef. b Coef B Sign
Constant 2.73 0.00
Capacity (skills) of experts 0.50* 0.37 0.00
Left 0.25 0.04 0.25
Voters of Ciudadanos 0.73* 0.07 0.02
Voters of PP −0.30 −0.04 0.26
Voters of UP 0.32 0.04 0.22
Voters of PSOE 0.57* −0.09 0.01
Control Variables
Efficacy, not debate −0.20 −0.05 0.07
Politics difficult for people like me 0.10 0.03 0.30
Political Trust 0.03* 0.08 0.02
Social Trust −0.02 −0.01 0.64
No Materialism 0.54* 0.09 0.00
Participation vs representation 0.09* 0.09 0.00
Education −0.14 0.06 0.06
Age 0.01 0.03 0.26
Nº of cases 1027
R2 0.21
* Coefficients where p < 0.05.
political decision-making by experts. If the same individ-
ual rates the capacity of experts with a 5, their support
for political presence will increase to 5.5, and if experts
are considered very capable (10) then the support for
this formula of government will jump to 8. The result is
particularly robust given that it remains stable regardless
of any other control variables that may be included in
the model.
There are six other significant variables, although
with a lesser explanatory capacity. Firstly, Ciudadanos
voters are more in favour of an expert government
than the rest of the population, confirming results
by Lavezzolo and Ramiro (2017), supporting our third
hypotheses. Parties also matter in the case of socialist
voters who appear to have a significant lack of confi-
dence towards experts, a tendency which has also been
suggested by our focus groups. In both cases, being a vot-
er of one of these parties increases (or decreases) the
overall tendency to support experts by more than half a
point (in a 0–10 scale).
Among control variables, post-materialist individu-
als are more inclined towards forms of government
with a stronger presence of experts, a result hitherto
not observed. The participation versus representation
scale has a modest influence, contrary to the direction
expected (Bertsou & Pastorella, 2017): more inclination
towards representative models (rather than participa-
tive) translates to a stronger support for experts in pol-
itics. This result is coherent with the positive effect reg-
istered for political trust and coincides with the associ-
ation between technocratic and representative prefer-
ences suggested by Font et al. (2015) for the Spanish
case, as well as with the qualitative analysis: support for
the role of experts is especially clear among those satis-
fied with representation.
Table 3 shows the results of the second dependent
variable, support for a wholly expert government, based
on a logistic regression. Here, the explanatory variables
which reach statistical significance are reduced consid-
erably: experts’ perceived capacities (skills) and two ide-
ological variables are important—left-wingers are more
reluctant to the idea of expert government and voters of
Ciudadanos particularly inclined to it—as well as one of
the control variables, age. Figure 3 shows the marginal
effect of the main explanatory variable (perceived capac-
ity of experts), showing its clear consequences in the
expected support for an expert government.
Some of the explanatory variables (perceived capaci-
ty and vote for Ciudadanos) are the same ones, but oth-
ers change from the previous case, as suggested in our
fourth hypothesis. Leftist voters, for example, are not
overtly against experts (first dependent variable), but are
more clearly reluctant to the idea that they should direct-
ly make collectively binding decisions.
Both models are free from multicollinearity prob-
lems: all correlations among independent variables are
below 0.4, VIF for all variables are all close to 1 and
always below 1.5 and the highest Condition Index among
all variables is 25.6 for education, still below the conven-
tional 0.30 threshold.
It could be argued that the perceived capacity (skills)
of experts is a characteristic which is conceptually too
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Table 3. Explanatory factors of support for decision-making by experts (logistic regression).
Support for expert government
Variables Coef. b Sign
Constant −3.32 0.00
Capacity (skills) of experts 0.21* 0.00
Left −0.54* 0.01
Voters of Ciudadanos 0.51* 0.04
Voters of PP −0.23 0.33
Voters of UP 0.08 0.74
Voters of PSOE 0.03 0.88
Control Variables
Efficacy, not debate 0.07 0.51
Politics difficult for people like me −0.00 0.97
Political Trust −0.01 0.40
Social Trust −0.02 0.45
No Materialism 0.05 0.78
Participation vs representation 0.01 0.86
Education 0.07 0.32
Age 0.01* 0.02
Nº of cases 1049
R2 Nagelkerke 0.08
* Coefficients where p < 0.05.
close to the reality to be explained, so that this fac-
tor could be unmasking the importance of other vari-
ables. To avoid this risk, we have replicated the twomod-
els, excluding this variable. Crucially, the results do not
change: among the 26 coefficients included in Tables 2
and 3 only one control variable changes from signifi-
cant to not significant (or vice versa)—materialismwould
no longer be significant in Table 2 with this exclusion.
Clearly, the explanatory capacity of the models is dras-
tically reduced, but the substantive story behind them
suffers no significant changes, if we choose to drop this








1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Figure 3.Marginal effects of perceived capacity (skills) of experts in support for expert government (95% confidence inter-
vals). Notes: X axis shows the values of the perceived capacity (skills) of experts. Y axis represents the level of predicted
support to expert government.
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7. Discussion
Previous research has shown the relationship of tech-
nocratic attitudes with citizens’ desire for political rela-
tions without anymediation, with less public debate and
more political efficiency (Akkerman et al., 2014; Bertsou
& Pastorella, 2017). Our study contributes to widening
the scope on this issue. The prestige attributed to experts
in our society, as opposed to parties and representatives,
may suggest a negative relationship between these phe-
nomena with the idea of politics without politicians. This
is, nevertheless, wrong. The majority of citizens are in
favour of a generic idea of politics with experts. People
think experts are important because of their knowledge
and technical skills. But when it comes down to detailing
their precise functions procedurally, they lean towards
a consultative role. Both focus groups and quantitative
analysis suggest that, for many citizens, demands for
experts are not at odds with representative democracy.
We find similarities and differences in the patterns
for social support of both types of pro-technocratic atti-
tudes. There are two factors clearly linked to them: trust
in experts’ skills (perceived capacity) and support for a
pro-technocracy party such as Ciudadanos. The first is a
conclusion which had been reached for other types of
political processes—ahigher degree of confidence in rep-
resentative or participative democracy, dependent on
the degree of trust bestowed on, respectively, politicians’
or citizens’ capacities (Del Rio et al., 2016). Our analysis
allows to extend this pattern to the case of experts: trust-
ing the capacity of the crucial actors in the political pro-
cess is an almost necessary condition to support it.
The relationship of technocratic attitudes with
Ciudadanos voters had already been pointed out by
Lavezzolo and Ramiro (2017). However, our analyses
show that this idea holds in all of the three different
scenarios: the conclusion remains valid with two differ-
ent measures of support for technocracy, in a political
context where visibility and support for Ciudadanos is
greater, and also when the equations include a larg-
er number of control variables. The direction of causal-
ity between these variables may be argued, although
their persistent relation is an interesting fact which helps
understand the nature of support for political forces with
technocratic components which are not situated at the
extremes of the political spectrum, as may be the case
with Macron in France or with several Eastern European
parties (Engler, 2020).
However, the distinct content of these two types of
support also implies that the remaining variables asso-
ciated with them are different. The only additional vari-
able related to support for the stronger version of tech-
nocracy is (absence of) left ideology, which is more disin-
clined towards the idea that experts should have the last
word in decision-making, a relationship that also came
up in the focus groups. If, on the other hand, we look at
the more generic support for experts, we observe that it
is less pronounced amongst socialist voters and people
with a lower level of education (both, in quantitative as
well as in qualitative analysis) and amongst people who
are confident in the representative system; this reaffirms
the idea that for these supporters technocracy is not in
any way seen as an alternative to representative govern-
ment, but rather as a possible and desirable component
of the latter.
Our results do not suggest that the technocratic incli-
nation of citizens is not an important factor, as many arti-
cles in this monograph demonstrate. Rather, we confirm
the existence of an important inclination of citizens for
technocratic efficiency. The problem that our research
opens up is that this desire for political efficiency does
not yet appear to have fractured the basic procedural
principles of party democracy. On the contrary, appar-
ently representative democracy and technocracy (‘the
ideology of expertise’) mix well for many citizens. If the
ideology of expertise can be used by populist parties to
legitimate a rejection of party democracy, we needmore
research to be clear to what extent individuals will def-
initely support a non-pluralistic system. Following our
results, they won’t.
The results leave several unanswered questions to
whichwe need to heed close attention in future research.
Firstly, if until now postmaterialist values have been asso-
ciated with a predisposition to participative processes,
our results suggest that such values may also influence
positively the degree of support for the political presence
of experts. That is, it could be that people with more
cultural resources (traditionally postmaterialists) do not
want to be involved in politics directly, but may be more
prone to having different voices heard in the decision-
making process (not only politicians) and experts seem to
be a key figure in this postmaterialist narrative. Secondly,
there are many coincidences between the results of the
quantitative and qualitative analyses; it would, therefore,
be desirable to extend the triangulation of methods to
other studies in this field. For example, there are charac-
teristics, such as the clear distinction between the two
sets of centre-right voters (PP versus Ciudadanos) which
were observed less clearly in the focus groups and should
consequently be the subject of future research. The dis-
tinction between these different families of centre-right
voters regarding their relationship with expert govern-
ment should also be explored in different political con-
texts to determine whether this is emblematic or not of
the Spanish case. Thirdly, it would beworthwhile to inves-
tigate if the distinction between weaker and stronger
forms of support for technocracy is only typical of highly
pro-technocratic societies, such as Spain and Andalusia,
or whether it is also present in other polities less enthu-
siastic about experts (Finland, for example).
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